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SUMMARY
Georges Sorel’s use of the term diremption to describe his method has
long been found obscure. This paper shows that the term was
associated with Hegel, and that interpreting it in this light can help us
make sense of Sorel’s method. Sorel, this is to say, in his revision of
Marxism and his social theory more generally, was engaging specifically
with Hegelian philosophy. In addition to clarifying Sorel’s method, this
perspective allows us both to place Sorel more clearly in his fin-de-siècle
context and to draw connections between his work and more recent
marxisant theory.
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1. Introduction
Among Jacques Rancière’s provocations in his 2011 Aisthesis is an elegant definition, or at least
description, of both artistic and political modernism across the nineteenth and into the twentieth
centuries: one long attempt to prove G.W.F. Hegel wrong about the identity of the real and the
rational or, put differently, the contemporaneity of world and thought.1 Rancière is not making a
philological claim, but rather a more general point about how best to interpret the objects and
moments out of which he has constructed his dissident history of modernism. Everywhere, Rancière
is interested in how works of art interrupt given hierarchies or logics in moments of suspension, dis-
ruption, deconfiguration. ‘Social revolution’, Rancière writes, ‘is the daughter of aesthetic revolution’.
Thus, for instance, the general strike presents ‘an exemplary equivalence of strategic action and rad-
ical inaction’ of the kind that most concerns him.2
Georges Sorel (1847–1922) is not included in Aisthesis, although arguably the book’s historical
centre of gravity is contemporaneous with Sorel’s productive life.3 And indeed the phenomenon
at the centre of Sorel’s most famous work, Réflexions sur la violence, is the general strike, which
Sorel understands as a myth in a way that is not without parallel to Rancièrian aesthetics. Sorel’s
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art, trans. Paul Zakir (London: Verso, 2013), 62.
2Ibid., xvi.
3In fact, Rancière has written a little about Sorel, although as far as I can tell he has not done so for many years. See ‘De Pelloutier à
Hitler: Syndicalisme et collaboration’, Les Révoltes logiques 4 (1977), 23–61.





























reputation—as an antidemocrat, an apostle of the heroic and authentic proletariat, and an enthusiast
of violence to such a degree that he was able to pass from the left to the right—militates against his
inclusion in Rancière’s story. And yet, this paper argues, a fuller understanding of the conceptual
‘topography’ of Sorel’s methods, to borrow Willy Gianinazzi’s usage, as well as just the kind of
quasi-philological investigation that Aisthesis eschews, suggest that Rancière’s frame fits Sorel per-
fectly well.4 Sorel’s work is anti-Hegelian, and not just in tendency. He explicitly engaged with
Hegel, attempting to cleanse Marxism of its residual Hegelianism, and ultimately sought to constitute
a social science method that would be anti-Hegelian. He did so ultimately in order to eliminate the
hierarchising tendencies he believed socialism had inherited from Hegelian idealism. These terms are
not simply transparent, and we will have to investigate what Sorel meant by them. The particular
term with which this paper is concerned is one that might well describe Rancière’s project:
diremption.
After myth and violence, diremption is probably the next word associated with Sorel. He used this
word, relatively late in his writing life, to describe his own method. Diremption was not, as has some-
times been said, a neologism of Sorel’s.5 The central historical claim of this paper is that in using this
word, Sorel is signaling a reference to and critical engagement with Hegel, or in fact Hegelianism.6 It
is an explicit attempt to escape a dialectical approach to social reality. By diremption, Sorel meant a
method that would be constitutively disruptive and bound to institutions striving for the greatest
possible autonomy within society. This is to be contrasted, for Sorel, with a method, Hegelianism,
which is essentially integrative and apologist—idealist and rationalist rather than materialist and his-
torical. To take diremption as a method is certainly, for Sorel, to make a metaphysical choice for
pluralism over unity; but the choice is not simply gratuitous. Diremption is opposed to idealist, tota-
lising Hegelian methods partly in its political consequences, and partly because, as Sorel argues, it
corresponds better to the practice of scientific and historical work.7 Hegel’s slogan, ‘the rational is
real’, to which Rancière obliquely refers, has famously been thought ambiguous. We can in a very
rapid way explain Sorel’s approach with his own formulation, ‘whatever is admitted as rational
soon acquires the right to be realized’, or, in another version of the same sentiment, this time as
an ironic description of idealist historiography of the French Revolution: ‘things recognized as con-
forming to reason by philosophers are destined to become real’.8
4Willy Gianinazzi, Naissance du mythe moderne: Georges Sorel et la crise de la pensée savante, 1889–1914 (Paris: Maison des sciences
de l’homme, 2006).
5The 1950 English translation marked the word out specially as without an equivalent in English, suggesting that Sorel perhaps
coined it himself. Georges Sorel, Reflections on violence (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950). More recently, Willy Gianinazzi, while not
offering any theory about the origin of the word, does complain about ‘la mauvaise lisibilité du concept’, due to its double func-
tion as both a metaphysics and a method. This ambiguity makes a great deal more sense if we take account of the Hegelian
origins of the word. Gianinazzi, Naissance du mythe moderne (47, see also 88ff.). See also John J. Cerullo, ‘A Literary Sorel: “Dis-
rempting” a Fin de SiècleMoralist’, History of Political Thought 24, no. 1 (2003), 131–49. See Stanley’s treatment of the term, which
is most extended in the introduction to Georges Sorel and John Stanley, From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
6Few scholars have brought Sorel and Hegel together. One very interesting example is the final chapter of David James, Art, myth
and society in Hegel’s aesthetics, Continuum studies in philosophy (London and New York: Continuum, 2009). More recently, one
article which appeared after the present article was under way makes a brief reference to the Hegelian origins of the term: Piotr
Laskowski, ‘Georges Sorel, l’intempestif’, Mil neuf cent: revue d’histoire intellectuelle 32 (2014): 161.
7Scientific practice provides a powerful justification for Sorel’s privileging of the plural over the unified. The experiment is effec-
tive because it is dirempted from nature as a whole. This is essential to it. One might well object that science nonetheless
requires the idea of determinism, however much held in abeyance. Sorel would respond that this is the ideology of science,
not its practice. So although the decision for pluralism and non-coherence is of course just as much a metaphysical one as the
decision for coherence, Sorel’s position is that it not only corresponds better to scientific practice and results and to our prac-
tical needs, but also is able to contain fields of coherence. It includes, we might say, determinism. On this issue, see Gianinazzi,
Naissance du mythe moderne ; and also Jeremy Jennings,. ‘Sorel’s Early Marxism and Science’. Political Studies 31, no. 2 (1983):
224–38.
8Georges Sorel, La ruine du monde antique: conception matérialiste de l’histoire (Paris: M. Rivière, [1902] 1925), 136; Georges Sorel,
Matériaux d’une théorie du prolétariat (Paris: M. Rivière, [1919] 1929), 35. In the very first text in which Sorel claimed to be a Marx-
ist, in the full flush of Marx’s arguments from political economy, he wrote that ‘ce qui est rationnel et démontré doit devenir réel’;





























This article will first frame the issue of Sorel’s reading of Hegel in terms of nineteenth-century
French Hegel reception and also of Sorel’s approach to German writers in general. Second, the article
will place, both in a chronological and a conceptual sense, Sorel’s textual references to Hegel. The
third section will explore the negative or critical significance of diremption, while a fourth and
final section will confront its productive aspect. These two sides, or moments, of diremption emerge
each in its own historical context. Diremption as negation appears slowly, first in 1903 as Sorel jug-
gles historical analyses of the Catholic Church and different forms of socialism, finding its full
expression only in a methodological postscript to Reflections on Violence in 1910. A few years
later, on the far side of his experience as maître-à-penser to young monarchists, returning to reflect
again on the longer term significance of his own investigations into socialism, Sorel presents diremp-
tion as a moment in a process—however ambivalent and fraught—of creation. Together, these two
moments are best understood as phases of a longer term response to the challenge of Hegelian social
theory. Having understood diremption, we will be better placed to understand Sorelian myth as the
creation of a collective subject—that is, as politics. A subsidiary goal here is to argue that scholars
interested in French philosophy have much to gain from reading Sorel more carefully. His texts
repay careful reading both because they have been constructed more thoughtfully than is immedi-
ately obvious, and because substantial neglected portions of European intellectual history are power-
fully refracted through them.
2. Hegel in France
The French reception of Hegelian philosophy began in Hegel’s own lifetime with Victor Cousin’s
enthusiastic, if perhaps not rigorous, recapitulation of a philosophy learned from the master him-
self. There was also an important socialist current of Hegelianism, which included in different
ways Saint-Simon, Comte and Proudhon.9 After 1848, in the authoritarian context of the Second
Empire, a strong Hegelian influence was felt in the historiography of Jules Michelet. Hegel was
invoked in the 1850s and 1860s in debates over positivism. Sorel would likely have been aware
particularly of how for Ernest Renan and allies of the quasi-empiricism that he represented in
philosophy and historiography, Hegel was an enemy, associated with excessively unifying idealist
narratives.10 The Franco-Prussian war in 1870 cast a shadow over discussion of anything German
for decades—arguably until it was replaced by the much darker and longer shadows of the twen-
tieth century.11
9Cousin, a figure of the intellectual opposition during the Restoration, traveled to Berlin in one of several periods of exile and met
with Hegel personally. His 1828 lectures were famously a non-credited recapitulation of Hegelian philosophy of history. Cousin’s
personal prominence and eventual institutional power made his re-interpretation of German idealism into what became known
as eclectic spiritualism enormously influential in nineteenth-century French academic philosophy. For Cousin and his immediate
legacy, see Jan Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2005). For later echoes, see John I. Brooks, The Eclectic Legacy: Academic Philosophy and the Human Sciences in Nineteenth-
Century France (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998). See also, on mid-century reception and recapitulation, Éric Puisais, La
naissance de l’hégélianisme français, 1830–1870, La philosophie en commun (Paris: Harmattan, 2005). For a slightly later period,
and with a special emphasis on socialist Hegelianism, see Michael Kelly, ‘Hegel in France to 1940: A Bibliographical Essay’, Journal
of European Studies 11 (1981), 29–52. And the response: Bruce Baugh, ‘Limiting Reason’s Empire: The Early Reception of Hegel in
France’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 31, no. 2 (1993), 259–76. See also Michel Espagne and Matthias Middell, Von der Elbe
bis an die Seine: Kulturtransfer zwischen Sachsen und Frankreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Deutsch-franzœsische Kulturbibliothek
(Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1993); Michel Espagne, Le creuset allemand: histoire interculturelle de la Saxe, XVIIIe–XIXe
siècles (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000); Michel Espagne, En deçà du Rhin: L’Allemagne des philosophes français
au XIXe siècle (Paris: Cerf, 2005).
10See on Renan and Vacherot: Morgan Gaulin, ‘Refonder la philosophie en 1860: Ernest Renan critique de Vacherot’, Nineteenth
Century French Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2009–2010), 52–66. Renan was one of Sorel’s great intellectual masters, although it is not
always straightforward to say what Sorel learned from him.
11The language used by the French to describe the quasi-Hegelian Prussians after 1870, and the language that, for instance, Hob-
house uses in 1914, are remarkably similar. It had become more difficult, by 1939, to see the Germans, this time the Nazis, as
Hegelians. On this, and the citations from Hobhouse, see Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1968).




























Sorel was born in 1847 and worked a whole career in the French civil service in the provinces.12 In
the early 1890s, he retired and moved to Paris. Virtually his entire adult life was spent within what
Claude Digéon long ago called the ‘German crisis of French thought’ triggered by the catastrophe of
1870–1871.13 In the wake of the war, engagement with German scholarship was highly politicised
and often suspect. Yet Sorel was never an intellectual nationalist. His first two books, both published
in 1889—on the Bible and the trial of Socrates—cited German scholars approvingly, in particular
Eduard Zeller. Sorel would continue to engage with German writing in the social sciences and phil-
osophy, including Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, but also less classical figures such as the mechanical
engineer Franz Reuleaux and the founding figure of psychophysics, Gustav Fechner. It should be sta-
ted at the outset that Sorel read all of these texts in translation. Although he had studied German at
the Polytechnique, he was never comfortable reading it.14 And, of course, Sorel in the 1890s embraced
not just socialism, but Marxism despite an often-repeated claim that Marx’s writings were torturous,
ponderous, impenetrable and, worst of all, Germanic.15 If Sorel objected with brutality to some of the
leaders of the German Social Democrats (SPD), he maintained a correspondence with Eduard Bern-
stein, who he regarded as an ally during the revisionist crisis. Even the eruption of war in 1914 did
not bring out nationalist or anti-German impulses in Sorel. He believed from early on that the war
was a catastrophe and that the ‘plutocratic’ and ‘Jacobin’ Entente would eventually prevail.
By the 1890s, speaking schematically, the belief among French philosophers was that philosophy
should either purify its concepts—best accomplished through a return to Kantian criticism—or it
should take its cues more directly from the vast strides being made in the physical and brain
sciences.16 The legacy of German idealism was key to these debates, especially for the younger cohort
of philosophers around the newly founded Revue de métaphysique et de morale.17 Sorel was deeply
engaged with these arguments. Certain prominent neo-Kantians such as Émile Boutroux and ration-
alist Octave Hamelin did suggest that that the Hegelian ‘concrete universal’might be pressed into the
service of French epistemology as a mediator between empiricist and rationalist positions. This was
the seed-bed out of which sprang the French tradition of épistemologie – historicised epistemology
that would issue in, among others, Michel Foucault.18 Hegelian thinking might have had a place
there. However, the explicitly anti-Hegelian positions of all major contenders in French philosophy
at this time left little rhetorical room for even partial borrowings of Hegelian concepts.19 Not until
12On this period, long thought to be more or less inaccessible to historians due to destroyed archives, see the pathbreaking Alice
Ingold, ‘Penser à l’épreuve des conflits. Georges Sorel ingénieur hydraulique à Perpignan’, Mil neuf cent. Revue d’histoire intellec-
tuelle 32 (2014), 11–52.
13Claude Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870–1914 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959).
14Tommaso Giordani, The Uncertainties of Action: Agency, Capitalism, and Class in the Thought of Georges Sorel (PhD diss. European
University Institute, 2015), 42.
15Such was the description that Gabriel Tarde gave in a dismissive book review that triggered Sorel’s public declaration, in a letter
to the editor, of his own Marxism, cited above. Gabriel Tarde, ‘J. Bourdeau. Le socialisme allemand et le nihilisme russe’, Revue
philosophique 35 (1893), 78–84.
16Much of this account is drawn from Baugh, which is in some sense a response to Kelly, ‘Hegel in France to 1940’, cited above.
Baugh, whose focus really remains the twentieth-century Hegel debates around people like Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Levinas,
argues that these positions were already implied by the critiques leveled at Hegel, and the uses to which he was tentatively put,
in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Baugh, ‘Limiting Reason’s Empire’.
17Xavier Léon, one of the founders of the journal and the individual most actively involved in it—eschewing an academic career in
order to devote himself exclusively to promoting professional institutions for philosophy in France—was a Fichte specialist. See
Stéphan Soulié, Les philosophes en République: L’aventure intellectuelle de la Revue de métaphysique et de morale et de la Société
française de Philosophie (1891–1914) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009). Brandom ‘Liberalism and Rationalism at
the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 1902–1903’ French Historical Studies 39, no. 4 (2016) Forthcoming.
18Joel Revill, Taking France to the school of the sciences: Leon Brunschvicg, Gaston Bachelard, and the French epistemological tradition
(PhD. diss Duke University, 2006).
19Baugh argues that this position was already over-crowded. Hegel was squeezed out of the field of French philosophy. Between
the neo-criticist Léon Brunschvicg—a figure of substantial institutional power in professional philosophy by the first years of the
century—and Henri Bergson—who wielded much less institutional but certainly more cultural influence—there was simply no
room for Hegel. A third figure here is Durkheim, who was similarly, if ambiguously, hostile to Hegelian abstraction in sociology.
Pierre Birnbaum, ‘La conception durkheimienne de l’Etat: L’apolitisme des fonctionnaires’, Revue française de sociologie 17, no. 2
(1976), 247–58. Left entirely to the side in this discussion has been the reception of Hegelian aesthetics by generations of French





























the 1920s and 1930s would a new generation of French philosophers turn to Hegel, and then not least
in order to better understand Marx.
In sum, in Sorel’s earlier productive years, Hegel was widely held to be the chief ideologue of Prus-
sian militarism. His real-is-rational slogan meant in practical terms an amoral worship of the powers
that be, and in philosophical ones a self-absorbed but also imperial rationalism, or panlogism, that
was not only opaque but also inadequate to the complexity of the world.20 The contrast would have
been with Kant’s rigorous ethics and careful delimitation of reason’s space of operation. This did not
discourage Sorel from engaging with German thought. Our interest in Sorel here begins with his
emergence as arguably the most sophisticated and certainly the most creative French Marxist of
the fin de siècle.
3. Sorel’s Hegel
In the 1890s, Sorel came to think about the relation of Marx to Hegel well armed not only with the
tools of non-Marxist sociology, but also with the tradition of French philosophy of science. Sorel’s
reading of Hegel, like that of Marx, was sustained but necessarily highly mediated by the availability
of texts and prevailing preconceived ideas. For instance: an Italian Hegelian, Augusto Vera, was
responsible for the vast majority of the translations of Hegel into French.21 One important mediating
text is Plekhanov’s essay on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Hegel’s death.22 There, the
Russian Marxist presented a Hegel who above all demonstrated that an honest and rigorous idealism
could not explain the world. Hegel, Plekhanov argued, frequently resorted at difficult moments to
materialist explanation—meaning, by this, economic explanation for historical change.23 References
to Hegel are scattered throughout Sorel’s writings. The 1896 essay on the Neapolitan philosopher of
history Giambattista Vico makes continual reference to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion. Citations
suggest that at least by late 1898, Sorel had read substantially in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. Sorel’s reading,
from whatever distance, was incisive and sustained.
The great arguments over the epistemological status of Marxism naturally pushed Sorel to enquire
into the meaning of the dialectic, and this meant forming an opinion about Hegel. This was a meth-
odological question of some weight. Antonio Labriola’s sustained defense of dialectical method, and
Sorel’s ridicule of it, was no small part of the reason for the rift between him and Sorel.24 For Sorel,
Bénard of a commentary on the Aesthetics. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Charles Bénard, Hegel. Esthetique (Paris:
G. Baillière, 1875).
20Michael Kelly cites Beaussire and Ravaisson, both supposedly commemorating the centenary: ‘Between then they did not so
much commemorate Hegel as commit him to oblivion, for they represent almost the last comments to be made on the philo-
sopher within the French university for fifteen years’. Kelly, ‘Hegel in France to 1940’. 37. Kelly also emphasizes the arguments
around Hegel and positivism in the later 1850s—significant as this is, contextualising Sorel here would be too radically
speculative.
21By the end of the 1870s, he had put into French the entirety of the Encyclopedia, as well as the complete version of the lectures on
Religion.
22Roberto Dainotto has remarked on the rhetoric of mourning that typifies—not just the title—of the text through which Antonio
Labriola initiated philosophical discussion of Marx in Italy: ‘In memoria del Manifesto communisti’. The observation can perhaps
be extended. In this, which would later be seen as the heroic age of the construction of working-class political parties in Western
Europe, much theoretical writing already took place in the mode of mourning for a lost past. Roberto Dainotto, ‘Historical Mate-
rialism as New Humanism: Antonio Labriola’s “In Memoria del Manifesto dei Comunisti” (1895)’, Annali d’Italianistica 26 (2008),
265–82.
23Georges Plekanow, ‘Le philosophie de Hegel’, L’Ère nouvelle (1894), 138–44; 258–80. It was just this economistic interpretation of
materialism that Sorel would soon reject. L’Ère nouvelle lasted for only 18 issues, and almost immediately became difficult to
obtain. Sorel, however, evidently kept his copies of the journal, because he cites from Plekhanov’s essay still in 1909 Arturo Lab-
riola, Édouard Berth, and Georges Sorel, Karl Marx l’économiste, le socialiste (Paris: M. Rivière, 1923). Note: the Labriola in question
here is Arturo, a pugnacious younger revolutionary syndicalist, not Antonio, the older academic philosopher and defender of
Marxist orthodoxy. On the broader issue of French socialist Hegelianism, see Kelly, ‘Hegel in France to 1940’, 38ff., 50.
24Labriola included, as an appendix to the French translation of his Discorrendo—written as a series of long letters to Sorel—several
pages from Engels’ Anti-Dühring on the dialectic. Sorel (trained in theoretical mathematics) was unimpressed by Engels’ dem-
onstration of the negation of the negation (−a* − a = a). In a review of Labriola’s book, Sorel deplored that Labriola, ‘accepte,
sans chercher à la concilier avec sa doctrine, ce qu’on a appelé la dialectique d’Engels et il a joint à son livre un passage où Engels
expose cette bizarre théorie… . J’avais fortement engagé M. L. à supprimer cet appendice’. Georges Sorel, ‘Labriola—Socialisme




























the dialectic was always a means of resolving apparent paradox.25 In a letter to Benedetto Croce from
December 1897, he complained that despite the ease with which it is invoked, ‘what above all seems
to me obscure is the dialectical method’. Sorel asks, ‘would it not be better to suppress this expression,
the dialectic, and everything connected to the negation of the negation? It would be a great progress,
given that, for our contemporaries, this whole Hegelian apparatus has no meaning’.26 We can say
that the dialectic appeared to Sorel as just one more way of finding always the same thing, of getting
always the same, pre-established answer, no matter the question posed. Sorel did not change his
mind about this, returning to the theme again in 1909. There, Sorel allows that Marx himself wanted,
in the famous phrase, to put Hegel’s ‘dialectical machine’ on its feet, although only for expository
purposes.27 Yet, Sorel concludes, Marx never really escaped the toxic phrase-mongering of the
young Hegelian 1840s. All the more so today: ‘I really am afraid that the Marxist’s dialectic has some-
times lost touch with the firm ground of experience’.28
However, Sorel saw that Marx had inherited more than remnants of idealism from Hegel. In an
article on the future of Marxism from 1899, Sorel cites a passage from Capital on the inevitability of
proletarianisation, which he says occupies roughly the same place in Marxism as the fourth Gospel
does in Christianity. In a footnote to this passage: ‘no one has yet observed… that Marx’s theory of
the proletariat is entirely borrowed from Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. The revolution has as its object
the passage to general self-consciousness and thus to bring about the reign of reason on earth’.29 Sorel
promises that he will look into this question at length later on. In a text first delivered as a lecture and
probably written soon after the one just mentioned, he returned to Marx’s Hegelianism, saying that
Marx ‘remembered what Hegel wrote about the opposition of master and servant, and about the pro-
cess through which reason appears at the moment when this opposition disappears. The disciple…
perhaps… even exaggerated the influence that reason was to have in the society of the future’.30 It is
a measure of Sorel’s capacity as a reader that he makes this connection—generally associated with
Alexandre Kojève’s lectures in the 1930s—between Marx and the Master–Slave dialectic. Yet he
et philosophie’, Revue philosophique 48 (1899): 109. See also Sorel’s remarks on what he believes to be Engels’misunderstanding
in the Anti-Dühring of the slogan from Spinoza, ‘definitio est negatio’. Sorel, ‘Lettere di Georges Sorel a B. Croce’, La critica, 25
(1927): 108. Letter from 1 April 1898.
25For instance, the letter from 14 January 1896 to Croce, speaking about Campanella, Hegel and paradox. ‘à son époque personne
ne songeait qu’on pût corriger un vice autrement qu’en supprimant la cause; il nous semble, aujourd’hui, que la correction doit
provenir du complet développement, épanoui au grand soleil du réel, de toute la cause. Avant Hegel, personne ne pouvait sou-
çonner un pareil paradoxe’. Sorel, ‘Lettere’ 41.
26‘mais ce qui me semple surtout obscu c’est la méthode dialectique… . Ne conviendrait-il pas de supprimer cette expression la
dialectique, et tout ce qui se rapporte à la négation de la négation? Ce serait un grand progrès, parce que, pour nos contempor-
ains, tout cet appareil hégelien n’offre aucun sens’. Sorel, ‘Lettere’, 52. Croce offers a footnote to this passage, suggesting that
Sorel is echoing William James’ ‘On Some Hegelisms’, published in 1882. It is extremely unlikely that Sorel knew this text. One
possible connection here, which in fact was not made, is with Giovanni Gentile’s explosive essays around the Theses on Feuer-
bach. Gentile there discusses Sorel with approval. Sorel had certainly received a copy of this text, but it seems to have made little
or no impression on him, and it is possible he did not read it. Giovanni Gentile, Opere complete di Giovanni Gentile (Firenze: San-
soni, 1955), 64ff.
27Labriola, Berth, and Sorel, Karl Marx l’économiste, xxviii.
28Ibid., xxx.
29‘Nessuno ha ancora osservato, mi pare, che la teoria del proletariato di Marx è tolta ad imprestito dalla Filosofia della spirito de
Hegel (§§ 434, 435). La rivoluzione ha per iscopo di passare alla coscienza del sè generale, e allora avverrà il regno della ragione
sulla terra. Io mi propongo di scolgere questo concetto in uno studio sull’origine hegeliana del marxismo’. Georges Sorel, ‘Dove va
il marxismo?’, Rivista critica del socialismo 1, no. 1 (1899): 13.
30‘se souvenait de ce que Hégel a écrit sur l’opposition du maitre et du serviteur, et sur le processus par lequel apparait la raison, au
moment où cette opposition s’efface. Le disciple n’a pas reproduit purement et complement la pensée de son prédécesseur; mais
il s’en est inspiré et peut-etre meme a-t-il exagéré l’influence que la raison devrait avoir dans la société future’. Georges Sorel,
‘L’éthique du socialisme’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 7 (1899): 282. See also, from the same few months, and also pub-
lished in RMM, the footnote on Hegel: ‘le lecteur voudra bien se reporter aux §§ 436–440 de la Philosophie de l’esprit de Hégel
pour comprendre l’origine de cette théorie, de même qu’il faut se reporter aux §§ 431–435 pour bien comprendre la théorie du
prolétariat. Je me réserve de revenir amplement plus tard sur ces bases hégéliennes du marxisme’. Sorel, ‘Y a-t-il de l’utopie dans
le marxisme?’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 7 (1899): 171. Andler, in his treatment of Hegel, mentions the Master–Slave
relation, although he does not explicitly connect it to the Bourgeois–Proletariat relation. Charles Andler, Les Origines du socialisme





























does so from within the frame of a mainstream French critique of Hegel’s panlogism, and of the
excessively unifying nature of Hegelian reason, above all when applied to history.31
This Hegelian leftover in Marxism was thus not to be applauded, but rather explained and
excised. Sorel, not unjustly, always regarded sloganeering about the reign of reason as indicating a
desire to bring about the supremacy of those believed to embody reason—bourgeois intellectuals.
This, as he argued again and again in different ways over his career, was one mechanism in the inti-
mate connection between rationalism and Statism.32 Just as those devoted to abstract inquiry tend to
support the state or something that aspires to be a new state, so too do states have an essential ten-
dency to try to impose, in a necessarily destructive way, clear and rigorous categories onto a social
world that is not in and of itself clear and distinct, which contains much overlap and ambiguity. Sorel
here sounds notes not too dissimilar to certain more radically anti-statist liberals, but also familiar
from contemporary anarchist theorising.
4. Diremption as negation
Sorel used the word ‘diremption’ first in 1903, in consideration of the Church, modernity and liberal-
ism. According to Sorel, many philosophers ‘postulate that the mind [l’esprit] requires unity; but this
is completely inaccurate’.33 Contradictory logics manifestly exist in every historical formation. The
work of genuine historians like Renan, according to Sorel, made this clear. Historiography that seeks
to reduce everything to a single causal order simply does not work as historiography—it becomes
something else. Sorel writes that
man cannot create unity in his thought unless he allows himself to give up part of reality. In order to construct a
new metaphysics that corresponds to our needs, it must be admitted that in coming into contact with the world,
our mind divides itself into distinct ideologies, which deal with areas that become more separate as we gain a
broader knowledge [connaissance] of the real. Humanity has always acted as though it understood this meta-
physics and the evidence of history legitimizes the enterprise of those who seek to create this philosophy of dir-
emption to replace that of unification.34
We will best understand ‘diremption’ when we understand it to be designed specifically to counteract
what Sorel here calls the philosophy of ‘unification’ and which, I argue, is Hegelianism.
The word was certainly not an invention of Sorel’s. According to Littré, diremption is a correct, if
obscure, French word ‘meaning, in terms of law, dissolution’, and particularly applied to marriage.35
Littré points to a use of the word by none other than Proudhon, commenting on the Church’s policy
towards divorce: In principle divorce is not admissible, ‘but, by a casuistic fiction’ if certain con-
ditions apply a given marriage can be said never to have existed, and this would be a diremption.36
Sorel gave no indication in 1903 that he was thinking of Proudhon, but certainly having studied
Proudhon deeply it is possible he made this association. Indeed, in a 1913 letter to Berth in which
Sorel expanded on the significance of the term as method, he also insisted that it had always
been, although unspoken, Proudhon’s own method.37
31Sorel returned to these criticisms of the dialectic in his 1909 preface to Labriola, Berth, and Sorel, Karl Marx l’économiste.
32Probably the most extended treatment of this question is in Georges Sorel and Yves Guchet, Les illusions du progrès: suivi de,
L’avenir socialiste des syndicats, (Lausanne: Age d’homme, 2007).
33Georges Sorel, ‘Léon XIII’, Études socialistes 1, no. 5 (1903): 265.
34Ibid., 265. Emphasis here and elsewhere in original.
35Littré says that the word was borrowed from English. The Oxford English Dictionary gives three meanings. The first two corre-
spond to the two senses of the word given by Littré, and are attested in the seventeenth century (Hobbes, for instance, provides, ‘
they cannot be parted except the Air or other matter can enter and fill the space made by their diremption ’). The third sense is a
special botanical one, referring to the separation of leaves, which also existed in French at least by the nineteenth century. Oxford
English Dictionary, ‘diremption, n’. (Oxford University Press).
36Specifically: ‘La clandestinité, l’impuissance, le crime emportant mort civile, l’erreur sur la personne, etc., sont pour elle autant de
cas de diremption de mariage’. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Les confessions d’un révolutionnaire: Pour servir à l’histoire de la révolution
de février (Paris: La Voix du peuple, 1849), 20.
37Georges Sorel, ‘Lettre à Ed. Berth’, Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon, no. 5–6 (1913), 263–65. Many thanks to Michel Prat for bringing
this particular reference to my attention.




























By the later nineteenth century, the term in French was strongly associated with Hegel and Ger-
man idealism more generally, and remains so today.38 For instance, a Catholic encyclopedia from the
1840s used the word in its article on metaphysics: Schelling ‘explains neither the why nor the how of
this primitive diremption that he supposes within absolute unity, the result of which is the manifes-
tation of the absolute in the double form of subject and object. [… ] This is the task that Hegel
undertook’.39 The word appears frequently in Auguste Ott’s 1844 Hegel et la philosophie allemande.
Etienne Vacherot uses it in 1869 in the context of a Hegelian account of Christianity, as a gloss or
equivalent for judgment.40 In general, in translations, diremption was used to replace Entzweiung. In
the usage of the time, diremption, then, is the moment of the dialectic in which judgment destroys
the unity of a notion, which must then be healed, or surpassed, by the Aufhebung into concept.41
Diremption, then, as Sorel uses it, signals an attack on the panlogism of Hegelian dialectics, oppo-
sition to the kind of unification—totalisation—that Hegel was taken to represent. Sorel, in selecting
this Hegelian word, is refusing specifically the Aufhebung, the dialectical resolution or, he says, uni-
fication. Abstract reason does destroy the apparent unity of its objects—and although this reason
does have a concrete foundation in institutions, no unity necessarily follows from this. As Sorel
maintained earlier in the same Church–State context, it is a mere prejudice, without scientific justi-
fication, to assume that the world has a rational unity in and of itself that could guarantee the rational
unity of human thought. Diremption, understood as an interruption or revision of the dialectic,
brings this principle up to the level of at once method and metaphysics.42
We can give some negative content to this attempt at an interruption of Hegel’s dialectic through
a brief comparison to how Benedetto Croce thought about Hegel. For Croce, in Hegel’s
dialectical treatment of the ordinary conception of reality…all the dualities…all the rents and wounds with
which reality shows itself to be lacerated by the abstract intellect, are filled, closed, and healed. A complete
unity (gediegene Einheit) is realised: the coherence of the organic whole is re-established; blood and life
again circulate within it.43
For Croce, Hegel gives us not an anatomy, but a physiology of reality. This dialectical healing of the
discontinuity of nature is what Sorel refuses. Diremption is, exactly, the creation of a gap in reality
through the workings of abstract intellect. Any pretense to a total vision of reality—that of the Catho-
lic Church, for instance, or of certain Marxists, and certainly that of any insufficiently self-conscious
scientists—is really a selective reading of a fundamentally non-coherent reality and should, at least by
philosophers, be recognised as such.
In 1910, Sorel added a chapter called ‘Unity and Multiplicity’ to a new edition of Reflections on
Violence. He there mounts a criticism of ‘sociobiological’ accounts of reality, which have sought the
prestige of biology by borrowing its images or metaphors (often without apparently realising that
38Diremption is still sometimes used in English translations of Hegel and Hegelian philosophy, not always consistently. In the Nisbet
Philosophy of Right, it replaces ‘Zerreißung’ (§357). It appears in the Historisches Wörtebuch Philosophie in a discussion of Marx’s
‘Zur Judenfrage’, and the English translation of this text (Cambridge) also uses the word, but in the place of both Trennung and
Spaltung. This passage appears on 356–7 of the MEW, and on 40–1 of Berth’s translation for Études socialistes. Berth gives divorce
and scission, rather than diremption. Marx does use this and phonetically similar terms, but as far as I have been able to tell, not in
texts that were published during Sorel’s lifetime. Hegel himself also used the term in several places—for instance, the Enzyklo-
pädie §367. Vera’s translation of this passage (to which he assigns §368) does not. The bulk of Hegel’s uses of the term, as far as I
have been able to tell, in fact arrives in the sections on natural philosophy of organisms, particularly their reproduction.
39‘Métaphysique ’, in Encyclopédie catholique: répertoire universel et raisonné des sciences, des lettres, des arts et des métiers, formant
une bibliothèque universelle, ed. Jean-Baptiste Glaire (Paris: Parent-Desbarres, 1848), 473.
40Auguste Ott, Hegel et la philosophie allemande; ou, Exposé et examen critique des principaux systèmes de la philosophie allemande
depuis Kant, et spécialement de celui de Hegel (Paris: Joubert, 1844); Étienne Vacherot, La Réligion (Paris: Chamerot et Lauwereyns,
1869), 17.
41See the ‘Hegel’ entry in Franck’s Dictionnaire; J. Wilm, ‘Hegel’, in Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques, ed. A.D. Franck (Paris:
Hachette, 1847), 32; and Charles Bénard, ‘L’esthétique allemande contemporaine: l’esthétique du laid’, Revue philosophique 4
(1877): 247.
42This is parallel with Hegel’s dialectic, these ambiguities of which Frederic Jameson has recently stressed. See the first chapter of
Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2009).
43Benedetto Croce and Douglas Ainslie,What Is Living and What Is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (London: Macmillan, 1915), 51–2.





























biologists themselves borrowed first from the social world). Sorel maintained that there existed fun-
damental differences between physiology and social philosophy. Most importantly, physiology can-
not investigate a given organ without relating its function to the whole of the living being. In contrast
‘social philosophy’, Sorel wrote,
in order to study the most significant phenomena of history is obliged to proceed to a diremption, to examine
certain parts without taking into account all the ties which connect them to the whole, to determine, in some
manner, the character of their activity by pushing them towards independence. When it [social philosophy] has
thus arrived at the most perfect understanding it can no longer attempt to reconstitute the broken unity.44
Here, as elsewhere, diremption is a method required to understand an institution that has success-
fully claimed some autonomy. Here, that is again the Church. In certain periods, the Church sur-
prises everyone by demanding again absolute independence, experiencing an institutional
renaissance. These periods reveal ‘what constitutes the essential nature of the Church; and thus
the method of diremption is found to be fully justified’.45 But the approach is not simply analytically
useful. It responds to the nature of social reality, which Sorel believed to be irreducibly plural.
Sorel’s adoption of diremption signaled a clear refusal of any Marxist sociology that took relations
of production as in-the-last-instance determinants. It also cuts against the tendencies of most sub-
sequent Marxist analysis in the sense that it rejects even the heuristic use of the appeal to totality.46 If
Reflections was a profoundly voluntarist attempt to impose or shore up class categories that Sorel saw
to be eroded by the developments of modern democratic politics, the diremptive method rejects any
unifying logic of capital at work in the world. We must then ask, in what sense is Sorel still a Marxist?
It is significant that Sorel articulated diremption most fully in 1910. He had by this point broken with
the CGT and, in April of 1910, published a piece in the far-right Action française (AF) newspaper.
This moment has drawn sustained attention from those trying to pin down Sorel’s significance for
the ideological battles of the twentieth century. Sorel’s alliance with the right should not be mini-
mised. Affiliation with the AF did not last long, but Sorel founded a journal, L’Indépendance,
together with a cohort of younger intellectuals who had passed through the AF’s tutelage. This jour-
nal lasted until early 1913. In these years, although Sorel wrote copiously for newspapers, especially
Italian ones, about political life, he did not produce significant social theory. He turned, rather, to
more ‘pure’ philosophy, publishing several important essays in the Revue de métaphysique et de mor-
ale, the seat of university philosophy in France. Sorel was still very much concerned with Marx and
Marxism, but his politics had indeed shifted to one of refusal. His attachment to the right is best
understood as support for those who seemed to most effectively reject the seductions (very much
Sorel’s word) of parliamentary government. In this sense, Sorel’s later philosophy is—like Western
Marxism, at least according to Perry Anderson’s contentious definition—a product of reflection on
defeat, loss and the absence of a generative proletarian movement with which to think.
5. Diremption as production
And yet diremption also had a productive side. There was, perhaps, nothing that Sorel regarded with
more suspicion than the attempts of intellectuals to be socially ‘productive’ through their writings.
We must therefore approach Sorel’s own gestures in this direction with great care. In 1914, Sorel
composed a preface for a collection of earlier texts, to which he gave the titleMatériaux d’une théorie
du prolétariat. The goal of the volume was to put before the world the results of Sorel’s free inquiry
into social reality in the hopes that the material would be useful. He made no pretense that any
44Georges Sorel and Jeremy Jennings, Reflections on Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 263.
45Ibid., 268 (translation modified).
46The standard work here remains Martin Jay,Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984). Sorel makes a number of supporting appearances in this book. Jay takes Sorel’s investment in
totality to be a sort of Bergsonian projective holism. That is, for Jay’s Sorel, Marxism becomes an integral, all-determining ethical
standpoint for those involved in it.




























unified theory could emerge from the materials united in this volume. Indeed, if such a theory did
emerge, it would demonstrate a failure to truly engage with social reality. The preface itself is an
attempt to recuperate something of this ‘free spirit’ by pursuing ‘the healthy interpretation of sym-
bols’, above all that of Marxism.47 In the course of this project, Sorel returned to and re-elaborated
the concept of diremption. Here, it is not only a refusal of the Hegelian, statist, rationalism that per-
sisted in Marx’s thought, but also a moment in constructing what, elsewhere in his work, Sorel called
‘generative’ social science description.48
What does Sorel mean by a ‘healthy’ understanding of symbols? Sorel rejected the idea that any
single logical framework can encompass the world as we encounter it. The result of attempts to
impose such a logical framework is rationalist monism. Against rationalist monism, Sorel insists
on pluralism, both political and explanatory. This is especially relevant for the necessarily political
social sciences. Sorel simply does not believe that, in the given state of society, it will be possible
to provide a useful symbolic reduction of the social situation. That is, in the context of Sorel’s career,
the general strike is no longer a valid myth. But this is not presented as a fact, only an impression.49
This is not, as has been so often asserted of Sorel’s work, an irrationalism. Rather, Sorel argues, when
reason is concerned with the ‘civic matters [chose de la Cité]’, it has two criteria. First, it should be
able to make use of ‘our constructive faculties’ in order to develop, in the wake of diremption, a ‘sym-
bolic understanding [connaissance]’ of the essentially non-rational products of history. A paradigm
of this symbolic understanding, relevant to Sorel’s professional life, is the reduction of an engineering
problem like building a bridge to a set of formulae; we might also think of a mathematical model of
an economy. Second, this symbolic knowledge should be able ‘to direct us as wisely as possible
through our everyday difficulties’.50 If one succeeds in creating a useful abstraction of this kind,
then one will have arrived at a philosophy of history. Rationalists, writes Sorel, have often understood
by this term speculation ‘on the morphological evolutions of institutions, ideas, or moeurs’, but for
Sorel it suggests ‘the control that a philosopher is able to exercise over the living realities of history’.51
The Book of Daniel is one exceptionally powerful such work. But so, too, do the anticlerical institu-
teurs of the Third Republic deploy a philosophy of history as they engage, often with great success,
the villages of France.52
This is what Sorel had earlier called ‘generative historiography’. And here he suggests that we can
understand a number of important ideological constructs as diremptions, always undertaken with a
view to some sort of project. So, for instance, ‘the man of which the Declaration of Rights speaks is
evidently a symbolic being, obtained through a diremption’.53 This figure was then rolled into a pol-
itical project, and became, we might say today, naturalised. Its origins in a diremption were forgotten.
A similar process has taken place with the Homo eoconomicus of classical economics as well as, and
with different intent, Marx’s concept of the proletariat.54 The self-consciousness of the diremptive
method is supposed to ensure that we remain pluralist, and do not take the unity we have created
through diremption, however helpful it may be in practice, to be the real world: ‘It is absurd to
want to obtain clarity from a diremption and to then forget what diremption is when making use
of its results’.55 This absurdity is the state into which official Marxism, Sorel believed, had fallen.
Sorel wanted to account for the origins of the idealist elements of Marxism, but also to trace them
exactly. Like many later readers of Marx, Sorel’s interpretation relied on the existence of contradic-
tory impulses within the oeuvre. Sorel by 1914 believed that Marx had consciously adopted Hegelian
language only as a rhetorical device, a literary pose. But, as Sorel argued often happened to social
47Sorel, Matériaux d’une théorie du prolétariat, 14.
48See Georges Sorel, Le système historique de Renan (Paris: G. Jacques, 1906).



































science, the mode of expression soon overshadowed the material being expressed. The SPD, bearer of
Marxist orthodoxy, as it engaged increasingly successfully in democratic politics, demonstrated
clearly that it had left the substance of Marx behind to retain only the empty formulae. Perhaps,
Sorel suggested, even Marx himself had in the end been duped by the seductions of idealist histor-
iography.56 Marx, an extremely acute observer, saw a pluralist world. His writings describe a social
reality shot through with contradictions, change and instability. Yet because Marx also inherited
from Hegel ‘monist prejudices’, he believed that all this had to be reduced to a coherent unity in
order to be subordinate to human reason.57 ‘Marx saw quite well that this passage from heterogeneity
to homogeneity’ did not fit within the framework of antagonistic forces that he saw in history. Thus
there is a leap (catastrophic revolution) in which ideological forces (Marxism, consciousness) escape
from materialism.58 The social content of this leap, though, always remained obscure.
Sorel tries to remove this obscurity by a long and curious digression, fitted into the longer discus-
sion of Marx and Marxism, on Plato’s Republic. The argument is that Marxists, especially Engels,
have fallen into the typical utopian mode also employed by Plato. In the Utopia there are no real
human beings, only infinitely reproduced types. It is a psychologically satisfying fantasy, nothing
more.59 But so too, Sorel claims, did Marx himself model the proletariat in his writings—a diremp-
tion—after Plato’s communistic ruling class. Then, calling Plato ‘one of the most skilled writers of
Greek prose’, Sorel argues that by basing the prosperity of the Republic on a series of obviously mys-
terious preconditions, Plato was telling his readers that in fact the Republic was not to be read as a
legislative agenda for some potentially real society, but simply as an elegant way of presenting a num-
ber of theses about education, virtue and so on.60 Sorel is telling us how he believes we should be
reading Marx. That is, according to Sorel, Marx’s diremptive creation of the proletariat, as signaled
by the implausibility of the revolutionary leap from heterogeneity into homogeneity, should not ulti-
mately be understood as a work of social science, but as a way of presenting arguments and claims
about how one ought to live. Marx, like Plato, used textual or rhetorical strategies to solicit the ethical
engagement of the reader.
Much of Sorel’s text had been given over to a pitiless critique of Marxism’s confusions. Yet in the
final paragraph, Sorel turned rather sharply to reproduce a long quotation from an interview Ben-
edetto Croce had given a few years earlier. Sorel allowed Croce to say what Marxism had accom-
plished, what it had contributed to civilisation: it brought about changes in labour law to
materially improve the lives of the working class; in the intellectual realm socialism had been a
powerful counter to positivism and encouraged objective study of economic matters. More broadly,
Croce claimed, by standing up against reaction everywhere, it had worked to prevent a European
war. Sorel concluded that anyone who had ‘taken a part in such a noble work’ could be assured
of ‘a life usefully employed’.61 Thus, there is demonstrably great moral value in Marx’s writings—
they have had these effects in the world—in part because they do not present a closed or coherent
whole.
In the Hegelian dialectic, at least as Sorel understood it, an apparent unity was torn apart in the
moment of diremption, and then reconstituted by the philosopher into a new synthesis. In this way,






61Ibid., 52. Sorel quoted the interview from a volume in which Croce had collected his recent occasional pieces. This particular
interview had the title ‘Socialism is dead’, and dealt broadly with Croce’s understanding of his own trajectory through Marxism.
It had been a living faith for Croce in the 1890s, but it had failed him—as he believed it must fail all intelligent observers (the
perspective of rank-and-file socialists or syndicalists was not his concern). Sorel was perhaps especially interested in this text.
Croce there suggested that perhaps it was even Sorel’s acute analysis of revolutionary syndicalism in the Reflections that, by
so effectively explicating this myth, killed it. Croce’s idealism and elitism are, in fact, very far removed from Sorel, but became
extremely influential for later interpreters of Sorel. Benedetto Croce, Cultura e vita morale: intermezzi polemici, (Napoli: Bibliopolis,
1993), 152, 147–56.




























adopting the method of diremption, Sorel accepted that it is the task of the theorist to grasp and even
accentuate the incommensurable logics at work in the social world. But Sorel did not believe that it
was the task of the writer to resolve these contradictions. The gaps, incompletion, and fragmentation
of Sorel’s texts demand that the reader take the next step. The productive moment, the Aufhebung, is
not in the text itself, but in the reader. We do not find a closed system in Sorel’s books, as Sorel
believed that one did in Hegel. Rather, we find a demand, a solicitation for the activity of the reader.
As Sorel had written in the 1908 letter to Daniel Halévy that serves as an introduction to the Reflec-
tions, ‘it is my ambition to be able occasionally to awaken a personal vocation’, to awaken the ‘meta-
physical fire which lies hidden beneath the ashes’ in every person.62 The Aufhebung, Sorel suggests to
us, is this awakening, the passage from reason to will.
The preface to Matériaux was composed in July 1914, but the publication of the book was inter-
rupted by the war that, Croce believed, socialists had held off for so long. When the volume finally
did appear, just as the war ended, Sorel added a postscriptum to the preface marking in a sense that
what he had written earlier was now obsolete: ‘one must be blind not to see that the Russian revolu-
tion is the dawn of a new era’.63 The machinery of diremption must still perform its critical work, but
the new revolutionary movement in Russia meant that the dangerous generative activity which
might accompany diremption was no longer so necessary. A new symbolic order—’a new era’—
was imposed on the world not by writers, philosophers or social scientists, but by the practice of
Revolution.
6. Conclusion
Rancière’s 1981 La nuit des prolétaires presents a remarkable and almost unmanageable collection of
nineteenth-century ‘workers’’ voices to the reader.64 As Jason Frank has recently reiterated, the for-
mal difficulties of this text spring from a concern to avoid presenting the author as master.65 Readers
are left to encounter and synthesise on their own. In this way, Rancière and Sorel are alike. Both
refuse the knowing Hegelian absolute master. The Aufhebung is not performed in the text, but per-
haps suggested to the reader. Emancipation is to be practiced, not expounded. Contradictions are not
resolved, but proliferate. Both Rancière and Sorel are exceptional figures, and are in many ways at
odds with one another. Yet taking Sorel’s anti-Hegelianism seriously as a multidimensional charac-
teristic of his work allows us to trace connections, or repetitions, between his fin-de-siècle revisions of
Marxism and the work of a whole generation of French philosophers who themselves emerged from
the political experiences of the late 1960s with a profound ambivalence towards Marxism, especially
in its more totalising, Hegelian forms.66
We have seen that Sorel worked within a French tradition of Hegel interpretation that found
Hegel politically useless, but did look to him for solutions to epistemological problems. Sorel encoun-
tered Hegel first as an idealist holdover in Marx. He found that he had to reject the Hegelian leftovers
in Marx during the Revisionist crisis. Hegel, he then believed, had led Marx to place too much faith in
the ultimate rationality of history. As Sorel read Vico in the later 1890s, he looked increasingly back
to Hegel—perhaps to help fill in the gaps that seemed to be left by Marx’s focus on the economy. The
Bernsteinstreit convinced Sorel at once of the empirical weakness of class analysis and also of the
inability of the Marxist parties to escape their own formula.
It was in reflecting on the capacity of the Church to remain autonomous over the centuries, to
resist subsumption into the social and political structures within which it operated, that Sorel arrived
62Sorel and Jennings, Reflections on violence, 7.
63Sorel,Matériaux d’une théorie du prolétariat, 53. Sorel also, rather perceptively, asks whether the defeat of Germany has not meant
the ruin of the bourgeois liberals rather than the aristocratic Junkers.
64Jacques Rancière, /Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France/ (London: Verso, 2012)
65Jason Frank, ‘Logical Revolts: Jacques Rancière and Political Subjectivization’, Political Theory 43, no. 2 (2015): 255–6.
66This is one way to describe what Laskowski is doing, although he proceeds really from Deleuze to Sorel and then back to other





























at the concept of diremption. And the term remained associated at several points with the problem of
the Church in society. If there is a way to make rigorous use of the nation as a context determining
the differences between Sorel’s thinking as French and some German and Italian interlocutors, this is
a good place to start. The political field Sorel encountered in France presented him with a variety of
totalities, two in particular that were actively threatening: the Jacobin Republican state, and the
claims of the Catholic Church. In the nineteenth century, and even the early twentieth, in Germany
political totality was a distant and beautiful dream, not an active danger. Here is a fundamental
difference in orientation between Sorel—who sought only and always to escape totality—and both
German and Italian interlocutors, who may be said to have looked for solutions to political and social
problems in imagined, virtual totalities. Croce, Gentile, and Gramsci, in very different ways, sought
to construct the Italian nation within which politics could be pursued.
It was with diremption, understood as an explicit modification of dialectical method, that Sorel
recovered the fundamental Marxist category of the proletariat from the Bernsteinian critique of
its empirical validity. He did so first by disaggregating it from the totalising framework of capitalism
that had given it meaning for Marx, and in a second phase reconstituting it as a constructive political
principle. Diremption does not deny rationality or reason, but it does localise and delimit the unity of
reason. It is a subjectivism contained and made rational by a consciousness of its own material con-
ditions and the limits they set. Diremption denies the capacity of reason—the Hegelian philosopher
—to encompass reality as a whole. This gives it an implicit political force. For Sorel, Hegel was always
the thinker of the State. Hegelian thought tends to support statism, Sorel believed, and those in
power gravitate towards Hegelianism. This means a logic of abstraction capable of assimilating any-
thing to preconceived categories, as well as a teleology able to justify any kind of action. That this
opinion was strongly influenced by the reading of Hegel current in nineteenth-century France
does not lessen its importance for understanding Sorel. Diremption interrupts this process of
abstraction and self-justification, and is therefore the philosophy appropriate to enemies of the
State. We can see here that the State came to define, if negatively, even the concepts and institutions
that were supposed to supplant it.
This paper has skirted a difficult problem, which is Sorel’s way of understanding the formation of
collective subjects capable of political action in the modern world. Having investigated a bit the
Hegelian roots of Sorel’s diremption, we are finally positioned to understand Sorelian myth. Totality,
for Sorel, will be assumed by the individual as an ethical act. Since there is no telos, no absolute to
guarantee at any level the dialectical resolution of distinction, we do not have a Hegelian Aufhebung.
We have rather myth, which is not a description of the world, but the expression of a will to act. It is
discursive, but at the most material level—emotive and empty of conceptual content. It is enough,
however, to resolve the gap between individual and collective, although only in a temporary and ten-
uous way. The myth is the idea, or ideal, around which a collectivity generates itself as institution. But
the life-world of the institution cannot yet really exist when the individual acts on the myth to create
it—here the ethical gap is a temporal one—and here is revolution. Certainly Sorel thought this to be
deeply opposed to Hegel’s rationalism. If we follow Herbert Marcuse, indeed it is. Yet I think that if
we prefer, for instance, Gillian Rose’s Hegel, whose thought is always negatively related to reality in
the mode of the speculative, always engaged in a dramatic and experiential critique of what is, Sorel
may come to seem more Hegelian.67
It is one thing to clarify intentional meaning, and another to understand the resistance or lack of
resistance to alternate readings put up by a given body of work. Sorel’s Reflections, indeed his best-
known texts taken altogether, constitute a revolutionary theory that is organised around reflexive
refusal of the state and the obscure formulation of myth moving between individual and collective
subjectivity. The record Sorel left behind in his books and in his political affiliations was taken to
mean that a myth, without an obvious rational connection to empirical reality—dirempted—
might be the sign of a will strong enough to impose itself on history. This was a conflation of Sorel’s
67Marcuse, Reason and Revolution; Gillian Rose, Hegel contra sociology (London: Athlone, 1981).




























methodological caution in social thought with a claim about the world itself. A conflation, it must be
said, that Sorel sometimes himself invited and certainly that his own diremptive method did not
allow him sufficiently to resist.
With the term diremption, as I have argued here, Sorel adopted an involuted version of the Hege-
lian dialectic, at once a method and a metaphysics. If Sorel rejected Croce’s notion of a dialectical
healing of the rents in the fabric of reality, he nonetheless followed Croce in conceiving of these
rents or gaps as distinctions, rather than contradictions. If we have no unity, we can really have
no contradiction, and the living pulse, the musical rhythm of dialectical conflict and resolution,
becomes an undifferentiated, atonal roar of grinding gears and failing components. Neither social
reality nor good social science is musical. We do not find music in the world. We put it there.
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